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Abstract— At the end of the criminal intelligence analysis process 
there are relatively well established and understood approaches 
to explicit externalisation and representation of thought that 
include theories of argumentation, narrative and hybrid 
approaches that include both of these. However the focus of this 
paper is on the little understood area of how to support users in 
the process of arriving at such representations from an initial 
starting point where little is given. The work is based on 
theoretical considerations and some initial studies with end users. 
In focusing on process we discuss the requirements of fluidity 
and rigor and how to gain traction in investigations, the processes 
of thinking involved including abductive, deductive and inductive 
reasoning, how users may use thematic sorting in early stages of 
investigation and how tactile reasoning may be used to 
externalize and facilitate reasoning in a productive way. In the 
conclusion section we discuss the issues raised in this work and 
directions for future work. 
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I. CONTEXT 
VALCRI (Visual AnaLytics for sensemaking in Criminal 
Intelligence Analysis) is a large scale integrating project 
funded by the European Community under the FP7 Security 
Programme. The project spans forty-four months with a budget 
of ~€13M and the consortium comprises seventeen partners 
from the EU and one from the US.  The project aims to create 
an advanced visual analytics reasoning and sensemaking 
system to support criminal intelligence analysis. This involves 
the development and integration of state-of-the-art technology 
that will include sophisticated user interfaces for techniques 
such as spatio-temporal analysis and semi-automated semantic 
knowledge extraction. The project will develop an analyst user 
interface that allows direct manipulation of information objects 
in an intuitive way, coupled with a reasoning workspace that 
allows analysts to exploit data in large data sets.  The reasoning 
workspace is broken down into a data space that allows the 
analyst to see and understand the data they have, an analysis 
space that provides direct manipulation functions to act on the 
data, and a hypothesis space to provide an area to develop and 
assemble chains of evidence into narratives and arguments. 
Thus central to the VALCRI system is the need to represent 
and externalise the analyst’s thinking, from initial stages where 
there is little information available and the way forward 
unclear, to the final stages of investigations where there may be 
much clearer understanding of emerging narrative and 
supporting argument. In this paper we begin by considering the 
state-of-the-art in the representation of ‘well-formed’ criminal 
investigations, by which we mean investigations in their later 
stages, and then consider the issue of supporting investigators 
in moving towards these. 
II. SUPPORT FOR THE LATER STAGES OF ANALYTIC 
REASONING 
In this section we consider literature related to evidential 
structuring and reasoning. We focus in particular on two kinds 
of structuring which we expect will provide value to VALCRI: 
argumentation and narrative. We see these two kinds of 
information structuring as particularly relevant to 
investigations at an operation level, and it is here that we intend 
to have our primary focus. This is not to exclude narrative as a 
consideration for volume crime analysis, particularly when 
narrative is taken as a coherent model or explanation. We will 
review the application of this context as well.  
Argumentation and narrative represent different ways of 
structuring information, which may be helpful and important 
for users. There are other kinds of structuring which may also 
be important, but for reasons of scope we limit our interest to 
these for the time being. This may be developed subject to the 
needs and direction of the project. 
Information structuring involves the segmentation of 
information into more or less well specified units (e.g. 
propositions, event descriptions, pages, documents) and linking 
them in terms of more or less well-specified relations (e.g. 
is_related_to, implies, happened_after, happened_before etc). 
All external representations necessarily adopt some 
representational convention, however loosely considered or 
defined. There are however many conventions for the kinds of 
entities and relations that may be adopted for external 
representational languages. For example, Blandford, Faisal and 
Attfield 2013 [1] propose six types: spatial, sequential 
(including temporal sequence), networks, hierarchical, 
argumentation structures and faceted. To this list we might add 
classification, the principle underpinning thematic sorting.   
Looking at research into different representational 
conventions one might be forgiven for thinking that for a given 
user task only one form is useful. Perhaps for reasons of focus, 
researchers tend to consider a single convention in isolation. To 
anticipate our conclusions slightly, it is unlikely that this 
represents the optimal approach. Tools which focus on one 
kind of relation may be less useful than tools that take a more 
hybrid approach. Nevertheless, the research context invites us 
 to consider different approaches separately, at least at the 
outset,  and so we begin by considering argumentation and 
narrative separately, and ultimately hybrid schemes which may 
combine representational forms.    
A. Argumentation 
Argumentation is a form of structuring that relates 
propositions or ideas through operators that make inferential 
relationships explicit. Although the propositions reference the 
domain under investigation, the relations reference the 
implications that an investigator may believe can be sustained 
concerning that domain. Hence, argumentation references both 
the domain under investigation and the logic underlying the 
investigator’s reasoning.    
The visual representation of argument has a long history 
and a number of schemes have been offered. In the early 
twentieth century, Wigmore developed a visual language for 
representing arguments in legal cases [2]. Wigmore’s 
diagrammatic convention represents competing arguments 
within an adversarial legal setting. It uses a graph-style 
notation known as Wigmore Charts in which the lowest-level 
primitive is the evidential proposition or statement. These are 
laid out in relations indicating inferential support. Wigmore 
diagrams include conventions for visually encoding aspects of 
competing arguments which may be important to a legal mind 
trying to evaluate their relative merit. For example, evidence is 
coded as to whether it is testimonial (stated by a witness), 
circumstantial (requires inference), explanatory (reduces 
impact of evidence) or corroborative (supports evidence). The 
side who offers the evidence (prosecution or defence) is also 
encoded. Wigmore Charts also represent the perceived strength 
of argument premises and of the argument as a whole. 
Toulmin presented a general purpose diagrammatic 
convention for the representation of everyday arguments [3]. 
Toulmin’s starting point was the idea that everyday persuasive 
arguments rarely correspond to classical models of inference, 
such as the syllogism. In Toulmin’s scheme there are three 
main parts: a claim (i.e. the conclusion); data (evidential 
support for the claim); and a warrant (a generalised rule on 
which a link between claim and evidence depends). There are 
also three supporting elements: backing (providing support for 
the warrant); a rebuttal (challenging the generalizability of the 
warrant); and a qualifier (e.g. ‘definitely’, ‘probably’ or 
‘presumably’ which, expresses a level of confidence in the 
claim mainly as a result of the rebuttal. In complex arguments, 
there may be several layers like this connected together.  
Notably, in everyday arguments warrants (and also backing 
for the warrant) are essential and yet are frequently implicit. 
For example, DNA evidence (data) and a conclusion drawn 
from that evidence (claim) necessarily depends upon a 
generalised rule about how evidence of that kind can be 
interpreted. Such rules are essential to arguments and yet are 
often not stated. The fact that they are not stated, may be a 
question of assumed common ground, but an advantage of 
making them explicit, of course, is that they are then more open 
to considerations of accuracy, relevance and support for the 
inferential move.   
Allen [4] offers a direct and modern implementation of 
Wigmore Charts, by concentrating on the foundational 
elements of logical evidence as used in a Court of Law. Like 
Wigmore, evidence is divided into testimonies (verbal or 
written accounts reported by a witness), and real evidence. The 
approach also represents generalizations which play the role or 
warrants. Real evidence is those items that are physical and that 
can be seen and handled by the jury, such as a piece of cloth or 
the alleged murder weapon. Generalizations are the 
considerations we have about the way things are in life - this 
can be either an understanding or a belief.  
These elements are represented in a hierarchical chart 
similar to that of Wigmore, culminating in the main argument, 
which is a classification of guilty or not guilty. This in itself, 
however, does not easily represent the impact of each element 
on the totality of the argument. The likelihood of a premise (as 
logical evidence) is therefore further expressed on a separate 
relevance scale of 1 to -1. The evidence gathered from each 
side (prosecution and defence) is plotted against this scale 
according to how relevant it is to an argument. If it supports the 
argument, then the evidence is plotted on the positive axis of 
the scale. If it contradicts or weakens the argument, then it is 
plotted on the negative axis. This makes it easy to spot which 
pieces of evidence can enhance an argument overall and which 
pieces of evidence may be helpful to opposing side.  
Allen also argues for considering the weight of evidence 
alongside relevance. The foundational evidence (testimonies, 
real evidence and generalizations) are weighted differently e.g. 
a testimony from a witness is regarded as having less weight 
than the testimony of an expert witness. Weights and relevance 
then combine to indicate how strong an argument may appear 
to a jury. However, this is further influenced with how well the 
prosecution or defence can present the “story” that the evidence 
is conveying (a point we return to later). Wigmore therefore 
still has a strong presence within the legal domain as seen 
within Allen’s representation.        
We end this section with a point about representational 
schemes in general and choices that there may be between 
usability, utility and scope. This is not specific to 
argumentation, although argumentation does provides case in 
point. Different authors, such as Wigmore and Toulmin offer 
different argumentation schemes based on different taxonomies 
of primitives and relations. The question arises, for any tool 
designer, of how to choose between them, or at least, how to 
choose between their parts in deciding upon the 
representational scheme of a tool. In relation to the three 
factors:   
Usability: One answer to this question of what makes a tool 
more usable is in the distinction between parsimony and 
expressiveness. We might expect that a tool which uses fewer 
primitive types and fewer relations necessarily will enforce 
fewer decisions on the user and so will be easier to learn and 
easier to use. However, this has to be qualified against the 
intuitiveness of the particular primitives and relations being 
used. Here, questions revolve around whether the distinctions 
made by the representational scheme are distinctions that the 
user naturally makes in the task context. 
 Utility: The utility question relates to whether a 
representational scheme makes explicit those distinctions 
which it is helpful to make in the task domain. For example, 
Wigmore and Allen make a similar distinction between 
testimonial or circumstantial evidence. But this is only worth 
doing if it buys leverage in using the representation in the 
context for which it is intended. Utility no doubt relates to 
intuitiveness since experienced users will probably already be 
thinking in ways which have utility for the task domain. 
However, a representational scheme may force a user to think 
in non-intuitive but useful ways.        
Scope: Finally, the question of scope relates to the range of 
task domains for which a tool is intended. A tool which is used 
in a more limited set of task domains can be more tailored and 
specific. It may use a smaller set of primitive and relation types 
to greater effect.    
B. Narrative 
A narrative is a spoken or written account of connected 
events organised temporally. Narratives represent a story or a 
chronicle. Implicit in this is the idea of events connected 
according to temporal ordering. But in narratives events are 
also connected through the involvement of common entities, 
characters or themes and events are often linked through some 
form of causation. As such, early events provide part  
explanation of later events. Narratives are not the same as 
evidence but are inferred from a combination of evidence and 
background general knowledge. Hence, they act as a form of 
situation reconstruction and explanation of evidence.        
Narrative representations are common in evidential 
reasoning. This is evidenced in part by the prominence 
temporal sequencing in the external representations created and 
used during legal investigations and court cases, such as  time-
series representations in LexisNexis CaseMap 
(www.casesoft.com) and IBM I2 (http://www-
03.ibm.com/software/products/en/intelligence-analysis-
platform). Storytelling, is frequently advocated as an important 
part of legal professional practice [5].   
Bruner [6] presented a constructivist account of the making 
of meaning. He emphasised the centrality of stories in 
sensemaking and to human experience in general. He argued 
that stories are instinctual and that they impact areas such as 
law that we may take for granted as being rather rooted in logic 
and reason. In fact, Bruner sees stories as central to the 
building blocks of human experience and to the construction of 
self. He asserts that narrative plays as central a role as logic, 
reason and science in explaining human experience. Even law 
proceedings, though peppered with logic and reason, are often 
concerned with the use of narrative to make progress. Rao [7] 
considers that an important contribution of Bruner’s is the 
observation that stories can be gateways to truths that are 
hidden behind a veil of facts, which we will miss if we only 
consider the facts. Thus narrative should be central to the 
process of sensemaking in evidential reasoning. 
The significance of narrative for investigatory sensemaking 
was demonstrated strongly by Pennington and Hastie [8], who 
were interested in developing a scientific description of the 
mind of the trial juror as revealed through the legal decision-
making process. They conducted studies using a simulated 
murder trial which was judged as representative by attorneys 
and trial judges. We focus here on one such study in which 
they presented evidence to participants in one of two orders: 
story order, in which evidence was presented in a temporal, 
causal sequence; and witness order, in which evidence was 
presented as it was by witnesses in the original trial. This 
manipulation was applied independently to statements for the 
defence and statements for the prosecution. A hundred and 
thirty college students listened to the statements after which 
they were asked to give a verdict on the accused. Of the mock 
jurors who heard the prosecution evidence in story order and 
the defence evidence in witness order, 78% chose guilty. Of the 
mock jurors who heard the defence evidence in story order and 
the prosecution evidence in witness order, 31% chose guilty. 
Hearing evidence presented in a story form seemingly biased 
participants towards that evidence. The explanation offered 
was that the information was just easier to understand when it 
was presented as a narrative.  
Studies like this provided the basis for Pennington and 
Hastie’s Story Model, according to which jurors make sense of 
trial information by constructing a narrative, which accounts 
for and explains the evidence. The narrative is created by 
reasoning from the evidence and also from general beliefs and 
expectations about the world. And since all jurors see the same 
evidence, one source of difference can be differences in  
general beliefs and expectations of the world.  
Further support for the significance of narrative in 
investigations was provided by Attfield and Blanford [9] in a 
study of regulatory e-discovery investigations. They observed 
that chronologies, painstakingly constructed by large teams of 
lawyers, provided central representations for sensemaking 
which investigation teams reviewed and collaborated around in 
depth. They reported that legal investigations can involve many 
people, extend over time, are resource intensive, and require 
the sifting and re-representation of very large collections of 
electronic evidence. Using the chronologies that were created, 
teams of lawyers were able to construct an underlying narrative 
of their investigated domain, identify periods of key concern or 
activities of protagonists that seemed odd and potentially 
suspicious, and using this knowledge, refine their investigation 
questions and searches in ways that were more focused and 
tractable—what Attfield and Blandford referred to as issue 
focusing.   
In discussing the application of predictive coding  
technology to legal investigations in practice, Chapin, Attfield 
and Okoro [5] argue that sensemaking in this context involves 
synthesising and testing narratives that are generated to take 
account of facts that emerge. Thus story-telling is seen as at the 
heart of evidential sensemaking. They make a case for 
structuring the process of e-discovery around narrative 
representations of evidence, and offer five guidelines. The first 
recommends narrative frame-working be used at all levels in 
the e-discovery process, for providing a heightened level of 
cognitive engagement and speeding up the process. Secondly, 
emerging subplots and episodes can allow the division of 
labour for both reviewer activity and predictive coding and 
supports cognition through decomposition and chunking. 
Designating a chief storyteller allows one person to get a 
 unique overview of what is happening and facilitates the cross-
fertilisation of information between subgroups. A fourth 
guideline is to use tools that externalise representations of 
stories, often as timelines. A final guideline is that no reviewer 
be left behind, there must be provision to allow all reviewers to 
catch up, explore and understand stories, but also to question 
and shape stories as they emerge.  
In recent years, questions of the significance of narrative 
for analysis in general have become prominent in the visual 
analytics literature. Segal and Heer [10] address the recent 
phenomenon of visualisations that attempt to combine narrative 
with interactive visualisation and note that crafting successful 
narratives requires skills more familiar to film directors for 
example than data scientists. The authors investigated a large 
set of visualisations (58 in total) in various domains (such as 
online journalism, blogs, instructional videos and visualisation 
research) to identify techniques for telling stories with data 
graphics.  
Their analysis shows how visualisation techniques and 
interactivity can enforce structure and narrative flow from 
forced linear narrative sequences to much more open ended 
user exploration, which may be less successful in engendering 
narrative. They produce a design space that has three 
dimensions of features: genre (magazine, annotated chart, 
partitioned poster, flow chart, comic strip, slide show and 
video); visual narrative tactics (such as visual structuring, 
highlighting and transition guidance); and narrative structure 
(including ordering the path the user takes, how the user can 
interact with the visualisation and messaging: the way the 
visualisation communicates observations and commentary).  
Segal and Heer [10] identified three main patterns within 
their design space. The first was clustering in how users are 
guided through the visualisation, which led to the identification 
of genres. The second was interaction design consistency. 
Across the examples, the same interactive techniques were 
used such as hover, highlighting, details on demand, limited 
interactivity, explicit instructions, and navigation buttons for 
multi-frame visualisations. There was also a consistency in the 
under-utilisation of tacit tutorial and default views that can aid 
narrative flow. The third pattern showed under-utilisation of 
common narrative messaging techniques, like key point 
repetition. The use of messaging and interaction with genre 
produce systems that trade off presenting the authors intended 
narrative with story discovery by the reader. This study is a 
useful analysis of narrative in visualisation but as the authors 
acknowledge the focus on graphical and interactive elements of 
narrative and they give less attention to the cognitive and 
emotional experience of the reader. 
Narrative seemingly plays an important role in the way that 
we make sense of evidence. Creating narratives is a 
constructive process, which rests as much on background 
knowledge and expectations as it does on the evidence itself. 
We expect that the generation, representation and review of 
narratives should play an important role in successful police 
investigation.      
C. Hybrid schemes 
Most research based on legal theory uses argumentation to 
structure and analyse evidence, whilst theories from a more 
psychological perspective have focused on stories. In a story-
based approach, evidence is evaluated and interpreted from the 
holistic perspective of the stories constructed around events as 
they occurred, whereas with the argument-based approach, the 
reasons for and against a proposition are central. Bex et al. [11] 
argue that both arguments and narrative are relevant and useful 
for reasoning with and for the interpretation of evidence. They 
propose a hybrid theory that encompasses both and formalise 
their theory and associated graphical notations as the basis for 
design of software to reason about evidence in complex cases.  
Bex et al. [12] cite Anchored Narrative Theory [13] as an 
important influence. Anchored Narrative Theory is a normative 
model motivated by studies of how judges in Dutch criminal 
cases decide on facts. Part of the theory is that story plausibility 
is evaluated with reference to how well it is anchored in 
common sense knowledge of the world. There are two kinds of 
anchoring: internal and external. Internal anchoring relates to 
the causal links within the story and the extent to which these 
are justified by plausible causal generalizations, such as, “If 
someone fires a gun, people nearby will hear the sound”. 
External anchoring concerns the extent to which the story is 
linked to available evidence–links which are necessarily reliant 
on generalizations such as “Witnesses usually speak the truth”.      
Bex et al.’s framework involves the construction of stories 
around facts in a case and supporting arguments, which are 
constructed based on evidence and common sense to support or 
challenge such stories, and comprises a method for making 
sense of evidence that allows reasoning about evidence and 
stories based on a sound underlying theory. The formal theory 
served as a basis for the sensemaking and visualisation tool 
AVERS which models reasoning with arguments as defeasible 
argumentation and reasoning with stories as abductive 
inference to the best explanation. The model of causal stories 
combined with evidential arguments is implemented in the 
system and the authors claim that informal contact with Dutch 
Police has strengthened the claim that the theory is close to 
actual reasoning with evidence. Two weaknesses that the 
authors note with their theory are that it doesn’t tell the user 
when a particular standard of truth has been met, and that the 
model does not currently support choice between rebutting 
arguments e.g. where there are two or more conflicting 
evidential sources.  
Bex et al.’s work makes a case for combining 
argumentational and narrative representations within a single, 
practical framework for supporting evidential reasoning in 
legal investigations, with the claim that this is based on both 
theoretical foundations and the way that people evaluating 
cases think. We have found evidence that users find hybrid 
approaches natural and helpful from an early study in which 
participants were asked to investigate a terrorist event using 
fictional news stories [14] and to externally represent their 
findings as either narrative, argumentation or as they wished. 
Analysis of the structures that they produced showed that in all 
conditions participants actually used combinations of narrative, 
argument and thematic sorting in varying proportions [15].  
  
III. SUPPORTING THE EARLY STAGES OF ANALYTIC 
REASONING 
 
A central concept in VALCRI has been the idea of 
supporting fluidity and rigour in analytic interaction. This is 
the idea that “The tools [we build] should fluidly link the 
generative, creative, playful and tentative exploration … that 
encourage exploration of alternatives, appreciation of the 
context, and the avoidance of premature commitment … [with] 
the more evaluative, critical inquiry that leads to a deliberate, 
final and rigorous explanation.” [16] In addition to the 
construction of meaning we intend that the VALCRI user 
interface and visualisation design will “… support and 
encourage self-checking – not simply reminding the person 
whether they are biased, but for example, facilitating the 
identification and easy removal of dubious or low reliability 
pieces of information in the data set to test for mutability and 
propensity.” [16]. 
To achieve this, the user interface and visualization design 
should  “… facilitate the discovery of meaningfulness of the 
situation … not as a property of the mind, but rather as a 
property of the situation or functional problems that operators 
are trying to solve …” [17]. Our aim in designing the user 
interface for VALCRI will be to support the representation of 
the invisible, such as the logical relationships between entities, 
and to support the process of creatively and playfully 
constructing assemblies of possible relationships between 
pieces or sets of information and turning them into unique 
chronological sequences or structures that enable one to 
articulate and explain the unknown. We therefore need to 
understand and define the nature of the thinking process that 
occurs in criminal intelligence analysis, and then design the 
visual representations that correspond and are compatible with 
the way the person deals with the assembly and structuring of 
information, and to construct meaning. We can then create 
views or externalizations of the thinking process in ways that 
can help analysts reason. When presented with a set of 
information that can be freely moved, manipulated, grouped 
and re-arranged in a visuospatial manner, the interaction can 
help discover meanings or relationships. Such actions have 
been described as epistemic actions [18][19][20]. The analyst 
benefits from such externalization by being able to engage in a 
reflective conversation with the situation [21] mitigating 
limitations in working memory; increasing rigor; reducing bias; 
supporting collaboration and supporting audit. For example, 
the simple act of writing – putting our ideas on paper where the 
drafting helps to establish our understanding of the topic being 
written [22][23].  
We have implemented an epistemic action we called tactile 
reasoning to support analytical reasoning by the direct 
manipulation of information objects in a graphical user 
interface or GUI. Takken and Wong [24] found that when 
people are able to directly manipulate data by moving and re-
arranging individual pieces of information to create temporary 
groups or sequences, or by eliminating pieces of information 
from a group, this can enhance their sensemaking ability. 
Participants who were allowed to physically re-arrange the 
information provided 99 sets of explanations of what their re-
arranged information could mean. In comparison, participants 
who were not allowed to re-arrange the data, were only able to 
provide 50 sets of explanations for the same data. 
Similarly, in a study that compared a user interface that 
allowed the user to freely move and re-arrange data with a 
traditional web-styled user interface, Kodagoda et al [25] found 
that the search performance of low literacy users using a free-
form user interface improved to almost that of high literacy 
users.  
A. How Analysts Think  
To devise external representations, we need to have some 
idea of the process we would like to represent externally. In 
this section we briefly describe our proposition of how analysts 
think [26]. This proposition is based on a set of focus group 
studies with 20 analysts, cognitive task analysis studies using 
think aloud protocols with 6 analysts, and another 6 librarians 
working on intelligence analysis type tasks. The study of 
thinking has been defined as including the study of a number of 
sub-fields: reasoning, judgment and decision making, and 
problem solving [27]. 
 
Fig 1. The thinking terrain [16] 
 
In our studies we focused on identifying and describing the 
nature of thinking as applied to the intelligence analysis task–
reasoning, problem-solving, inference making, sensemaking, 
and decision making (see Fig. 1). We then attempted to 
describe the thinking space for the purpose of guiding the 
design of user interfaces. The thinking space or terrain, can be 
described as a continuum. At one end, thinking is characterized 
by high uncertainty with a lot of unknowns. Here, the analyst’s 
focus is on gaining traction or starting a line of inquiry. At this 
point the problem may have something in common with so 
‘wicked problems’ insofar as they are ill-defined [28] and in 
need of formulation. We observed analysts engage in playful 
generation of tentative ideas and possibilities—plausible 
hypotheses—that could account for the data they have about a 
case, and in view of their professional goals and expertise. At 
this stage they rarely fully commit to one idea, but instead are 
checking out and testing whether ideas or hypotheses are 
worthy of further investigation, assessed in terms of their goals 
and constraints. The sensemaking at this time is based on a 
combination of abductive, inductive and deductive inference 
 strategies. They do not have all the data and are therefore 
required to infer outcomes that they then use to guide the 
search for relevant and supporting data. They also frequently 
re-organise and re-structure their data to create stories that 
afford explanation that provides the understanding that drives 
their reasoning, sensemaking, search and eventually the 
construction of a strong and rigorous argument. 
In criminal intelligence analysis, the final argument that 
concludes with a recommendation of the perpetrators must 
eventually be robust enough to withstand interrogation in the 
court of law. At this ‘formal’ end of the thinking space 
continuum, there will be less uncertainty, and strong 
commitment to the final recommendation. The process of 
moving from the generative end to the formal end of the 
continuum is not a linear process. It is unpredictable, 
depending on what is discovered and how the investigation 
evolves. It follows a zig-zag path where as one line of inquiry 
becomes strong, it may discover data that negates the claims 
that that line of inquiry makes, having to re-start or pick up the 
investigation from another point. Some of the more significant 
difficulties center around the generation of insight—the 
realization of what has happened or what needs to be done; and 
the formulation of hypotheses—the initial explanatory stories 
that are uncertain and based on limited data, which need to be 
tested but also drive and guide the investigation.   
Tools and methods have been developed to address the 
problems of critically evaluating those hypotheses once they 
have been derived (e.g. ACH, lynchpin analysis), but fewer 
tools have been developed to support the generative and 
tentative thinking at the early stages of the analysis. Kodagoda 
et. al. [25] present early observations of seven criminal 
intelligence analysts’ thinking and inference making process on 
how they structure, organize, assemble information and attempt 
to unpack arguments (claims and premises) they make. We 
show relationships between claims and associated premises and 
how induction, deduction or abduction inferences are 
intertwined in the analysis process while some inference 
making takes place concurrently rather than sequentially. 
During the early stages of the analysis, analysts create plausible 
explanations while assembling, combining data and also 
anchoring on previous claims made. The claims encourage 
looking for new data (evidence) with much rigor at the latter 
stages, while the early stages of the analysis was observed to be 
much more fluid and playful. This process depended on the 
availability of data, the situation and the analyst’s experience. 
Inference making also was observed to converge or diverge the 
analysis creating new understanding. 
B. Supporting the Thinking Process: Thematic sorting 
In section II we discussed the significance of argumentation 
and narrative for constructing evidence-based representations 
in crime analysis. In section III we focused on the process of 
investigation and how this develops from more fluid but 
uncertain beginnings to an account which is more formal and 
supported. Within this model, the creation of strong arguments 
and defensible narratives represents the end-game. A third 
kinds of structuring which we have found to be significant and 
also applicable to earlier stages, is thematic sorting.     
Thematic sorting involves classifying information objects 
(documents usually) into thematic groups. A theme may be a 
more or less well defined topic relevant to a sensemaking task. 
The themes, which emerge can provide an early organising 
principle. Where documents are drawn from a larger set, 
analysts often sort or ‘triage’ them for relevance against 
evolving investigation themes as a precursor to deeper analysis. 
Triage is often being an intermediate step between automated 
search and deeper analysis.  
Thematic sorting as an analytic step is illustrated, for 
example, in Pirolli and Card’s (2005) model of intelligence 
analysis [29]. Pirolli and Card reported a process model (shown 
in Fig. 2) based on cognitive task analysis with intelligence 
analysts. The model shows transformations that analysts 
perform in the process of conducting analysis. Boxes represent 
approximate data-flows and circles represent process flow. 
These are set out over two axes intended to indicate the extent 
of information structuring achieved (vertical) and effort 
expended (horizontal).  
The model has two major activity loops: a foraging loop 
(lower-left) and a sensemaking loop (upper-right). Foraging 
involves seeking information, searching and filtering it, and 
reading and extracting information. The sensemaking loop 
involves structuring information in terms of come schema and 
the iterative development of a “mental model” or 
“conceptualisation” from the schema that best fits the evidence.  
      
 
Fig. 2. Pirolli and Card’s notional model of intelligence analysis (re-produced 
from Pirolli & Card, 2005) Thematic sorting forms an early part of the Pirolli 
and Card model when structuring is low, appearing as ‘filter’ within the 
‘search and filter’ process (i.e. information triage). 
 
The Pirolli and Card model shows how thematic sorting 
forms an early stage to analysis, although the model says 
nothing about how these themes come to exist and how they 
may be affected by developing understanding. Thematic 
sorting may involve making binary choices (e.g. relevant or 
irrelevant) or it may involve grouping by multiple themes. In e-
discovery investigations, for example, lawyers conducting 
manual reviews often ‘code’ or tag documents against a series 
of current investigation issues [9].  
 Typically, during extended sensemaking tasks, themes 
evolve. Further, early stages of sensemaking and search may be 
beset with uncertainty. As far back as 1968, Taylor’s analysis 
of questions and negotiations at the library reference desk 
showed that information service users often begin with unclear 
ideas of what it is that they are looking for [30]. Belkin, Oddy 
and Brooks (1982) [31] offered their ASK hypothesis which 
stated that “…. an information need arises from a recognized 
anomaly in the user’s state of knowledge concerning some 
topic or situation and that, in general, the user is unable to 
specify precisely what is needed to resolve that anomaly” 
(Belkin, Oddy, & Brooks, 1982, p.62). An anomaly, in their 
sense, was recognition of some inadequacy in a conceptual 
state of knowledge with respect to some aim.  
Attfield and Blandford [9], [32] examined how large 
regulatory investigations are gradually decomposed into 
multiple lower-level lines of enquiry (themes). This led to their 
line-of-enquiry framework. Knowledge associated with a given 
line of enquiry can give rise to any number of more focused 
problems (or sub-lines of enquiry) with lines of enquiry at any 
level having a relatively consistent set of elements, which are 
tracked by investigators. These elements include: theories, 
questions, information seeking strategies, evidence collections, 
knowledge representations, assigned investigators and lower-
level lines of enquiry. Hence the framework is hierarchical and 
recursive. Evolution and the reduction of uncertainty are 
embodied in lower-level and more specific lines of enquiry 
whose findings propagate up to inform the investigation as a 
whole.     
In another study involving thematic sorting, Rooney et al. 
(2014) [33] observed a group of civil servants involved in 
intelligence analysis perform a simulated intelligence analysis 
task using the 2011 VAST dataset[14]. Participants used a tool 
called INVISQUE. An aim of the study was to observe how 
they would use the tool’s interaction capabilities to address the 
task. INVISQUE uses a visual metaphor that combines 
searching, clustering and sorting of document surrogates with 
free-form manipulation on an infinite canvas. In the study, 
participants initially sorted documents (news articles) into 
thematic groupings, which they then explored whilst 
constructing explanatory narratives. The narratives sought to 
explain the events reported in the news reports and were 
represented at the interface by chronological sequences of news 
report document.  
Notably, during thematic sorting, participants used both 
breadth-first and depth-first strategies. In the breadth-first 
strategy case, anything that looked relevant to a potential 
narrative was set aside for later examination. In the depth-first 
strategy case, each article that was suggestive of an explanatory 
narrative was explored in detail before selecting the next and so 
on. 
Hence thematic sorting can form an initial step in an analytic 
workflow, interleaved in different ways with more careful 




In this paper we have reviewed the support for 
representation and externalization and in criminal intelligence 
analysis. The review of models of argumentation and narrative 
demonstrates that much attention has been given to the later 
stages of reasoning, where thinking is more concrete and 
representation techniques quite well developed, allowing for 
the quite explicit externalization and analysis of thought.  In 
some sense this is easier to address than the earlier stages of 
reasoning which may be dogged by paucity of information and 
uncertainty. Consideration has then been given to the need for 
support for representation and externalization of thought in the 
early stages of investigation where the analysts may need to be 
tentative and imaginative to generate lines of enquiry which 
will give the traction necessary to ultimately lead to more 
defined results. This is described in a context where the 
investigation by necessity goes from being fluid and more 
wide-ranging to more focused and concrete where the 
representation of arguments and narratives can come into play. 
A focus on thematic analysis shows how important this process 
can be in supporting reasoning in the early stages of analysis. 
Future work will continue to look at how we can support 
representation and externalization of thought throughout the 
process of criminal intelligence analysis. 
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